A great challenge for capitalist development under authoritarian regimes is to effectively constrain predatory behavior. Beyond existing frameworks of the dictator's time horizon and institutionalized power sharing, we introduce an alternative perspective-elite cleavage. We argue that the systematic vulnerability of marginalized local cadres motivated them to ally with grassroots constituents and protect local economic interests in order to increase the odds of political survival. Difference-in-differences analysis of counties in two Chinese provinces shows that the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution created a moment of political decentralization which enabled marginalized local elites to protect local entrepreneurs against national-level radical policies, resulting in much more vibrant private economic activities in some regions. Further empirical evidence shows that elite cleavages formed in the 1940s had a long-lasting impact on economic performance in the reform era.
Introduction
Among authoritarian regimes, and even within one country at subnational levels, some authoritarian elites are predatory and stall the rise of a capitalist class, while others tend to refrain from predation and foster vibrant capitalism. A central question in the political economy of authoritarianism is: under what circumstances do authoritarian elites refrain from predatory behaviors and nurture capitalism?
The existing literature on authoritarianism advances two mechanisms that constrain autocrats' predatory behaviors. McGuire and Olson (1996) argue that "stationary bandits," autocrats with a long-time horizon, are sufficiently motivated to refrain from predatory behaviors.
Recent scholarship emphasizes the role of formal political institutions-such as legislatures, political parties, and elections-as another way to credibly tie the autocrat's hands against predatory actions, at least against small groups of elites (Magaloni 2008; Gandhi 2008) . However, because of the uncertain and brutal nature of authoritarianism and the absence of independent third party to enforce contracts among key actors (Wintrobe 1998; Svolik 2012) , authoritarian leaders are unlikely to be self-constrained as stationary bandits. And the credibility of authoritarian institutions to materialize the power sharing between ruling elites and make binding commitments to economic actors is open to doubt (Pepinsky 2014; Svolik 2012) .
Given the limitations of "stationary bandits" and "institutional constraints" in authoritarian settings, some scholars have emphasized de facto checks and balance against potential predatory forces, especially the alliance between different social groups and political actors (e.g., Duvanova 2013; Haber et al. 2003; Markus 2015) . However, business groups in this strand of literature are, or are assumed to be, well-organized and have the de facto economic power to check against state predation. Such explanations, therefore, may not be applicable to authoritarian settings where social forces are too weak relative to the state to deter government predation (Hoff and Stiglitz 2004) .
In this article we develop a novel coalition theory to explore the conditions under which a group of local political elites within a strong state would have the incentive to make an alliance with their grassroots constituents in a weak society. Under such circumstance, even if the national-level government was by and large predatory and sought to eradicate capitalist practices, some political elites still had the incentive to shield local capitalist practices from state predation.
For such an alliance to emerge, a key condition was elite cleavages which excluded or marginalized some local officials from the patron-client networks formed by higher level elites.
The marginalized elite had to refrain from predatory behaviors and protect local economic interests in exchange for popular support to mitigate their vulnerability to political attack.
Localities with such alliances tended to preserve entrepreneurship and nurture capitalism, paving the way for long-term economic growth.
We test the observable implications of our theory by examining the spatial variations in the spread of capitalism as captured by non-state sector development in China's Zhejiang province and Jiangsu province during the Cultural Revolution (CR, 1966 (CR, -1976 , when capitalist economic activities were prohibited by the socialist state.
1 In both provinces, the trajectories of the 1 Both provinces are coastal and are adjacent to Shanghai and to each other. Both were taken over by the Communists in 1949 and had similar levels of non-state sector activities immediately after 1949. Both provinces had similar income levels and similar levels of private sector economic activities in the early 1950s, thus making them comparable in terms of their initial economic conditions. In 1952, private firms accounted for 57 percent of sales value in the retail Communist revolution prior to 1949 led to a power configuration in which the local elite after 1949 was divided into two main groups. In both provinces, one group had extensive ties to the power holders at the provincial and even national level, while the other group was marginalized and relegated to lower level positions. More importantly, the marginalized group in one province happened to be dominant group in the other province, thus providing an ideal natural experiment to test our theory. We find marginalized elites were motivated to make concessions to grassroots constituents, leading to de facto protection of capitalist economic activities and vibrant entrepreneurship in some localities. In contrast, local political elites in counties governed by politically dominant factions depended on the satisfaction of high-level patrons and thus imposed policies in line with the latest political trends from higher levels, even predatory ones.
Eventually, capitalist economic activities tended to take off and flourish in counties governed by marginalized elites during the CR, and in part because of path dependence, these counties also performed better economically than the counties dominated by entrenched elites during the reform era.
This research sheds light on the rise of capitalism under a socialist state (Oi 1999; Huang 2008; Whiting 2001) and attributes it to the alliance between a segment of the political elite and social forces which tie the grabbing hands of local agents of the authoritarian state (e.g., Duvanova 2013; Markus 2015; Haber et al. 2003) . Our analysis also enriches the literature that links economic development to historical legacies (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2001; Mahoney 2010) .
Moreover, while the scholarship on local accountability or elite capture in developing world focuses on social embeddedness of local elites (Oi 1999; Mattingly 2016; (Liu 1992; Markus 2015) . By the same virtue, the capacity of mobilizing collective action constitutes a critical source of de facto political power, which in turn enhances the bargaining power of the marginalized in the regime and enables them to become indispensable problem solvers for certain social issues.
Compared with marginalized elites, entrenched elites from the dominant factions however, have less incentive to ally with grassroots elites and protect their economic interests, especially the non-state economic activities in a socialist state. For one thing, their political careers depend largely on loyalty to high-level patrons. Political mandates propelled them to follow the latest political signal emanating from the higher authorities, including carrying out radical policies to display their loyalty. In addition, entrenched political elites strive to maintain vested interests through "distributional coalitions" (Olson 1982) . In a country of socialist economy, entrenched elites have monopolized the state sector and could deliver benefits to political allies and crucial constituents (Shleifer and Vishny 1998 ). Yet capitalist development could empower social groups and thus posed a great threat to their entrenched interests (Acemoglu et al. 2006 ).
There is a rich literature in China studies on local elites' implicit protection of local private businesses (Tsai 2002 , Oi 1999 
The Emergence of Marginalized Elite: Revolution and Its Legacies
In both Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, the trajectories of the revolution prior to 1949 led to the emergence of disparate groups of local officials. While the dominant groups in these provinces had ties to higher level patrons at the provincial and central levels, marginalized groups, for various reasons, did not have access to such power networks. These two groups were clearly distinguishable and were represented in various degrees in sub-provincial localities, which shaped local politics in these two regions.
In Jiangsu, the local revolutionaries in the central part of the province managed to establish large base areas, which eventually became a core component of the Central China Revolutionary
Base Area (hereafter the CCRBA) during the Sino-Japanese War (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1942) (1943) (1944) (1945) . During the Civil War (1946 War ( -1949 Jiangsu natives from non-CCRBA area who were sent to take over the non-CCRBA area during the Chinese Civil War.
The revolutionary legacies had shaped the post-1949 political landscapes profoundly in both provinces. In Jiangsu, CCRBA cadres and their loyalists dominated counties which hosted communist bases during the revolution, whereas non-CCRBA cadres tended to exert greater influence in counties which had not been communist strongholds. In Zhejiang, southbound cadres were able to exert a firm control over counties that were less penetrated by local guerillas before 1949, whereas guerilla cadres maintained their influence over counties where they had fought guerilla warfare as early as in the Sino-Japanese War. The counties in both provinces thus can be categorized into dominant faction counties (DFCs) and marginal faction counties (MFCs).
In sum, DFCs were governed by CCRBA cadres in Jiangsu and by southbound cadres in Zhejiang, and MFCs were governed by non-CCRBA cadres in Jiangsu and by guerilla cadres in Zhejiang, as Figure 1 illustrates.
[Figure 1 about here]
More crucially, the status of DFCs or MFCs led to divergent incentives to protect capitalist activities at the county level. When the majority of county leaders were embedded in patronclient networks in the provincial government and relied heavily on higher level patrons to advance their careers, county officials in DFCs paid close attention to political signals emanating from the provincial capitals and from Beijing. They had strong incentive to display their loyalty to their patrons at the higher authorities by implementing radical economic policies desired by their patrons. In contrast, the county leadership in MFCs had only tenuous and often volatile relationships with the dominant groups at the provincial level. Thus, the marginalized groups' upward mobility was largely blocked, and very few of them were able to get promoted to higher levels after 1949. In consequence, local officials in the marginalized groups were reluctant to undermine their own local political support base for stymieing capitalist economic activities. 4 Instead, they had the motivation to protect the economic interests of grassroots elites and shield business activities from predatory policies mandated by higher level authorities.
Despite the divergent incentives between the dominant and the marginalized factions at the local level, the economic contrast between DFCs and MFCs was not so pronounced until the outbreak of the CR. Political atmosphere prior to the CR did not allow local officials in the MFCs to pursue economic strategies that were too deviant from the Party's official line. After all, there was a clear line of authority from the provincial level to the county and township levels, and provincial governments regularly sent work teams to inspect policy implementation at lower levels (White 1989) . Furthermore, the ideological campaigns launched by the Party center before the CR provided easy excuses for the dominant factions to demonize and then purge the weak factions, which left the latter very little space to maneuver (Forster 1990: 17) .
The CR as a Shock to the Dominant Factions and Its Consequences
The CR impacted political elite of different camps in different manners. Unlike the campaigns prior to the CR which primarily targeted the marginal factions, during the CR the incumbent power holders suffered an unexpectedly bitter blow. Although dominant factions never lost their dominance at the provincial level in these provinces, they became completely 4 Without the mass and grassroots cadres' cooperation, even the dominant faction would find it was difficult, if not entirely impossible, to purge their targets during power struggle. For example, during the Four-cleanups (Siqing) campaign in the early 1960s in Zhejiang province, a county's southbound leadership sent an investigation team to villages to collect evidence against guerilla cadres by charging them with embezzlement and abuse of collective public fund. These charges, if proven true, presumably would have eradicated guerilla cadres from the county's leadership. Although the local guerilla cadres were unable to overtly sabotage the investigations, they asked villagers not to cooperate with the investigation team and to collectively complain to the investigation team about the baseless nature of the accusation. After three months of investigations, the team left the village due to the lack of evidence. Interview by the authors in Wenzhou, July-August 2008.
preoccupied by attacks from radicals from Beijing and from the provincial capitals who heeded Mao's call to overthrow the provincial power structure (Forster 1990: 30; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006: 316) .
The dominant factions' fortune in both provinces ebbed and flowed primarily with the evolution of their power struggle and bargaining at the Party center. 5 Even amidst fierce factional infighting at the provincial level, provincial leaders still had to implement the radical economic policies from Beijing resolutely. Their local followers had to follow the radical line set forth by the provincial authorities, else face charges of committing the error of "economism"
(jing ji zhuyi) (Forster 1990: 27-28) . 6 Local officials in the Huzhou district of Zhejiang province, for example, showed no hesitation in prohibiting peasants from planting cash crops and from conducting businesses activities in order to implement the directives on focusing on grain production. In fact, any profit seeking activity was snuffed out due to the label of "conducting capitalism."
7
For the marginalized cadres, the CR actually intensified the threat to their survival since they now had to contend with Red Guard and military challengers to their power, as well as the incumbent dominant factions. On the other hand, for the first time since 1949, the marginalized political forces had the ideological justification to build up their grassroots political foundations, which bestowed them an opportunity that had never existed to resort to collective action to openly "rebel" against the dominant factions (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006). By resorting 5 For how the central politics and the intervention from the center affected the direction the CR in the two provinces, see Forster (1990) and Dong and Walder (2010) . 6 During the CR, it was natural for political elites to resort to means including increasing wages to transfer material benefits to masses as a strategy of mobilization, as the marginalized elite did. However, such a strategy, much less allowing non-orthodox economic activities like private businesses, was labelled as "economism" and prohibited by the authority. Therefore, the selection of the strategy was endogenous to local elites' political calculations. Even when provincial governments sent investigation teams to MFCs to prevent the spread of private and collective industries in theses areas, local officials in MFCs openly undermined these inspections, allowing the non-state sector to flourish. A prime example was Jiangsu's implementation of the central policy of "Grain as Core Task" (yi liang wei gang), which demanded farmers to place grain production above all other activities. In Su'nan area, where industrial production was emphasized over grain production, the provincial authority ordered the county leadership to organize struggle meetings to denounce cadres who supported local industries. However, a large scale purge of local cadres never came to fruition in the MFCs because both cadres and residents boycotted these meetings, which were organized by the provincial work teams. 11 The farmers and local cadres formed a natural alliance. Similar scenarios took place in Zhejiang's suppression of local private businesses.
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The historical evidence from interviews and archives above suggests that the CR afforded the elite in the MFCs with the unprecedented opportunity to enhance the symbiotic relationship with their grassroots constituents and to protect local economic interests. We thus have a testable hypothesis that in both provinces, non-state sector development-the hallmark of capitalismtook off and flourished in MFCs but was highly restricted in DFCs during the CR. In the next section, we test the hypothesis using quantitative data.
Empirical Tests and Results
To test our hypothesis, we first present evidence suggesting that the ownership composition of industrial firms at marginalized faction counties (MFCs) experienced a We also gauge whether the divergent power structure within these provinces exerted a longlasting effect on the variation in intraprovincial growth patterns in the post-CR period, which is measured as the average annual GDP per capita growth rate during 1978-1998.
Our analysis also includes a set of economic variables as controls such as total industrial output, GDP, total population and so forth. The county level data for Zhejiang are derived from
New Compilation of Statistics in Zhejiang: 1949-1999 (Zhejiang Statistical Bureau 2000). The county level data of Jiangsu province come from Fifty Years of Jiangsu Province and Fifty Years of Jiangsu Rural Economy (Jiangsu Statistical Bureau 2000)
. All variables are deflated to constant 1998 prices. We also control for some geographic variables including the length of coastline along a county's border, altitude, and the proportion of flat ground in total county area.
Summary statistics of the dependent variables are reported in Table 1(see control variables in   Appendix Table 1A ).
[ Table 1 about here]
13 Non-state firms include both township and village enterprises (TVEs) and private enterprises. While conventional wisdom treats TVEs as collectively-owned firms, Huang (2012) convincingly argues that the vast majority of TVEs were in fact private rather than public from the very beginning. Given this definition, we expect that in both provinces, after the onset of the Cultural Revolution, marginal faction counties would have had higher levels of non-state industrial development and more rapid economic growth than the dominant faction counties.
For Zhejiang Province, we use a dummy variable to code the MFCs. Based on the information collected by the authors from The Organizational History of CCP in Zhejiang:1922 Zhejiang: -1987 as well as various county gazetteers, we coded a dummy variable that takes the value "1" if a county maintained its own independent guerrilla forces from 1945 to 1948, "0" otherwise. Through interviews, we learned that in these counties, former guerilla fighters filled the ranks of lower echelon officials, which put them in positions to carry out market-friendly policies. It is worth noting that counties were unlikely to self-select into the treatment statusMFCs in our study. The formation of MFCs/DFCs in both provinces and the provincial power configurations were outcomes shaped by the Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War, which involved strategic interactions between the Kuomintang (then the ruling party), the CCP, and Japan in different periods. For instance, the decision to send troops by the Party center to certain regions was primarily based on military and strategical needs that had little to do with the local economy. Similarly, the timing of the CR was also an exogenous political shock that had to do with Mao's growing distrust of his anointed successor Liu Shaoqi (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006). Therefore, historical shocks and contingencies alleviate the concern of selection bias in our research design.
We employ a generalized DID approach to compare the effects of CR on non-state economic development between MFCs and non-MFCs. The model specification is as follows: 1978,1998 1978,1998 
Estimation Results
The Rise of Non-State Industry during the CR Table 2 reports the effect of MFC status on the share of non-state industrial output in total industrial output after the CR. Columns (1)- (2) In columns (4), we control for a set of geographic factors and the results are quantitatively similar and remain robust. One key assumption of DID framework is "parallel change", which implies that in the absence of shock, the outcome of the treatment group would have moved in tandem with the outcome in the control group. We cannot conduct additional tests to verify this assumption directly largely because non-state industry data at the county level before 1965 are not available. However, it is worth noting that the difference between MFCs and DFCs in our key dependent variable, i.e., the share of non-state industry output in total industry output, is small and insignificant in 1965(p-value=0.22 for Zhejiang province and p-value=0.94 for Jiangsu province), as Table 1 illustrates. Thus, we have more confidence of the validity of the parallel change assumption. From the historical perspective, private property and capitalist production were virtually wiped out with the collectivization movement in the late 1950s. We have little reason to believe that the development of capitalist economies had diverged prior to the CR.
[ Table 2 about here]
One concern of the above analysis is that the increase in the share of non-state industry simply may be driven by the decline of state industry as opposed to the development of non-state industry during the CR. To address this concern, we use the level of non-state industrial output per capita (logged) as the dependent variable and similar DID model specifications to estimate the effect of the CR on non-state economic activities. The results are reported on Table 3 . In Taken together, the results show that the level of non-state industrial output per capita between MFCs and non-MFCs in Zhejiang diverged during the CR and continued to enlarge during the post-1978 era, although the share of non-state industry tended to converge to a high steady state in 1998 (over 90% in this case, see Table 1 ) as privatization swept through Zhejiang in the 1990s. In column (2), we control for a set of geographic variables interacted with year dummies as we have used in the previous analysis. Furthermore, we also control for the non-state industrial output per capita level in 1965 interacted with year dummies to account for the changing effects of initial non-state industrial output. This strategy arguably can mitigate the concern of "parallel trend" assumption of DID model. In column (3), we use weighted regressions to give greater weight to changes in the densely populated counties. The regressions are weighted by counties' total population in 1965. This strategy can avoid the problem that the changes in a few small counties may drive the overall results. Reassuringly, after controlling for potential confounding variables and taking into account the size of counties, the results remain fairly robust.
With respect to Jiangsu province, the results in columns (4)- (6) (5)- (6), we take into account the effect of geographic features and population size and the results show that the magnitude of estimated effects becomes even larger.
[ Table 3 about here]
To further alleviate the concern regarding "parallel trend" assumption, we conduct a "placebo" test. As mentioned previously, the data on non-state industrial output prior to 1965 is unavailable. We thus investigate the trend of total industrial output per capita between MFCs and DFCs to provide some suggestive evidence (details in Appendix Table 2A ). In addition, we conduct another "placebo" test to lend credence to the identified mechanism. We use stateowned industrial output per capita as the dependent variable to estimate the effects of the CR on state-owned economy. If both the state and non-state sectors had developed in MFCs after the CR, the growth of non-state industry in MFCs could be attributed to other structural factors rather than local officials' incentives to refrain from predation and foster non-state economy. We find that state-owned industry did decline more in MFCs than DFCs so that we have more confidence of our theory (see Appendix Table 3A ).
The Rise of Non-State Sector and Long-Term Economic Performance
Given the findings that the MFCs developed a larger non-state sector and faster during the CR, we expect the early start of the private sector there to have a long-lasting effect on non-state economy development, especially if the provincial power configuration remained largely unchanged. As we have discussed above, in both Zhejiang and Jiangsu, the provincial power structure created in 1949 remained basically unchanged, despite the temporary shock to it during the CR. In fact, the old provincial leadership established before the CR regained power in the mid-1970s and continued to dominate the top provincial positions in the 1980s. Moreover, as the factional leaders of the first generation began to retire, they elevated their close protégés to top provincial positions. Officials from marginalized groups were still discriminated against at the provincial level in the 1980s. 15 Given the socialist nature of the party state and the second-class citizen status of the non-state sector relative to the state sector until now (Huang 2008) , MFCs, where the local elite still had incentives to protect the non-state sector, should have experienced faster economic growth in the reform era.
To test this, we use the average annual GDP per capita growth rate during 1978-1998 as the dependent variable and regress it on the dummy variable indicating MFCs. We control for the initial level of economic development measured as GDP per capita in 1978 (logged). We also control for a set of geographic variables that have been used in the previous analysis. Table 4 reports the estimation results. Columns (1) We also examine the effects on levels of economic development in 1998 measured by GDP per capita, total industrial output per capita and satellite luminosity (Henderson et al. 2012 ). The results in Table 4 suggest that MFCs in both Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces had higher levels of economic development than DFCs, controlling for the level of economic development in 1978
and a set of geographical variables. We also use matching methods to estimate the effects on economic growth and levels of economic development and find similar results (Appendix Table   4A ).
Another implication of our theory is that MFCs are likely to have more spending in public goods than DFCs because local officials in MFCs are more concerned with local economic interests. We use public goods spending per capita (including the spending on science, education, culture and health) and productive expenditure per capita (including fixed investment in public goods related projects) in 1998 as dependent variables in OLS regression. We control for the population size in 1998, levels of economic development in 1978 (to mitigate post-treatment bias) and a set of geographic variables. Table 5 reveals that the government expenditure in public goods measured by two variables at MFCs is significantly higher than that at DFCs. 16 We also control for the size of arable land in 1952 to account for the initial agricultural endowments. In addition, we consider the effect of human capital on long-run economic growth.
We collected the number of presented scholars (Jinshi) of during Ming and Qing dynasties in both provinces. For Jiangsu province, we cannot match this data to each county. As for Zhejiang province, we add this variable in the regression and find that the key results remain unchanged.
These results are available upon request.
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Conclusion
We have explored the political origins of the rise of capitalism under a socialist state by
showing that even when capitalist economic activities were prohibited by the state and the rule of law was weak, elite cleavage at the local level, combined with a major disruption in the command structure of the ruling regime, provided some degree of protection for private businesses. For a less developed country where the sunk costs of starting new businesses were relatively low, this form of localized protection provided sufficient assurance to entrepreneurs. In other words, as long as elites felt insecure due to their marginalized status within the regime, they had the incentive to create conditions that protected local economic interests.
Moreover, we suspect that the mechanism in this research is common in the developing world, especially where historical shocks have produced elite cleavages similar to the ones identified in this research, e.g., the local natives versus newly arrived Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan Localized protection provided in our theory has its boundary conditions beyond local elites' control. For one thing, the effect of localized protection is contingent on the ebbs and flows of national politics, like the Cultural Revolution and policies adopted by Beijing since the 1980s, which created space for local elites to form alliances. Such maneuvering space can be undone by policies from higher levels in a hierarchical authoritarian regime. More important, the marginalized elites within the regime provide protection to local economic actors but exert little influence in national level policy making, which is unlikely to compel national leaders to institutionalize property rights protection . While historical contingency can propel a handful of lucky regions into affluence, that window of serendipity may close at any time by national political shocks. Thus the symbiotic relationship between local elites and businessmen is at best viewed as a spatially limited solution, rather than the perfect substitute for national-wide de jure property rights protection in the long run. 
